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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant 
to U.C.A. 78-2a-3. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case is an appeal from a final order from the Second 
District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, entered by the 
Honorable Jon M. Mea'iraott on November 1, 1993. The appeal applies 
to all aspects of the case except the divorce decree. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
This is an appeal from the entire judgment in the case, 
except for the award of divorce. The issues presented on this 
appeal are as follows: 
1. Did the trial court fail to maintain standards for an 
instruntent of the court and proceed with trial overlooking 
totally unverified assertions and accepting false testimony? 
2. Did the trial court appropriately rule on the validity 
of a Antenuptial Property agreement? 
3. Did the trial court err in the determination of the 
need of the plaintiff for alimony and in the determination of the 
resources of the defendant husband? 
1 
4. Did the court fail to recognize that funds in 
retirement accounts are not available for alimony or a¥ard unless 
the funds were accrued during the marriage.'? 
5. Did the court inappropriately assign income tax refunds 
to the plaintiff vife, together with life insurance policies? 
6. Did the court award court costs inappropriately to the 
plaintiff? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
After an acquaintance of six months the parties were married in Laie, 
Hawaii on October 6, 1989. Early on in the summer, mid -July, they first 
discussed financial patterns in the event they should move in the 
direction of marriage.The content of the financial discussions, as they 
developed later., can be very briefly summarised. During the marriage, the 
appellant would provide financial support for all the routine expenses of 
living, including housing, travel, food and the like. In the event of 
termination of the marriage, each partner would take out of the marriage 
only what was brought into the marriage. There would be no alimony and no 
financial settlement. A "standard" prenuptial agreement was signed in the 
evening of October 5, 1989. 
On July 3, 1991 the wife separated, almost casually, after return 
from an extended trip about three days earlier. She refused an uncontested 
divorce when presented with papers in November 1989, and sought out an 
attorney reputedly competent to breach a prenuptial agreement. A suit was 
filed in April of 1992. The suit went to court on Nov i, 1993, at which 
2 
time wife pleaded ignorance of the meaning or content of the agreement. 
(An additional document had been drawn up the morning after the original 
signing, adding some specifics in the event of the husband's death.) 
At trial the Antenuptial Property Agreement was sustained., except 
for the provision which ruled out the payment of Alimony. Permanent 
alimony in the amount of $650 per month was awarded to the wife, together 
with $3500 award of tax refund, court costs, and two life insurance 
policies, total death benefits of about $10,000., for 21 months of 
marriage. Husband was stereotyped as wealthy by the plaintiff's attorney, 
and by the judge because he is a retired physician. The appeal process was 
therefore initiated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Frank ¥illis Taylor is a retired physician, age 75 at the time of 
this action. He married Mary Ellen Smith on October 6, 1989, now age 76. 
Both were at Brigham Young University - Hawaii in the fall of 1989, and 
throughout 1990, he as a health Instructor in the Physical Education 
department, she as a secretary in the Public Relations Department. 
Both returned to the mainland on December 19, 1990, having both been back 
home for more than a week in July for family reunions. 
Major renovations of the Taylor family home, with direction from a 
distance were not totally complete upon arrival home. The adaptation was 
strenuous but well tolerated. The plaintiff wife became involved in piano 
accompaniment for a junior high school production in the early spring, but 
had to be brought home in pain when she developed Herpes Zoster, 
(shingles) involving the right upper abdomen and back. She was promptly 
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treated with Acyclovir and prednisone with very prompt relief of 
symptoms, and more importantly with no sign whatsoever of post-herpetic 
neuralgia,tne very painrui ana almost constant sequel to shingles in oiaer 
people. However, her daughter from Virginia came flying in one day as 
though to rescue her from some evil force, and they took off for southern 
Utah canyons. On July 3,1991, wife took off, almost casually when it was 
pointed out quietly that there was considerable work to do after being 
gone for almost a month. 
In November she refused to sign papers for an uncontested divorce 
In March of 1993, a Verified Complaint was received denying all awareness 
of the prenuptial agreement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A brief summary of the argument by the defendant is as follows: 
The trial court looked past a specious document labeled "Verified 
Complaint" and proceeded as though it were legitimate. It demonstrated 
perjury by the plaintiff, and less than frivolous preparation by the 
attorney. 
Woodward v. ¥oodward Utah 656 P.2d 431 directs that Retirement 
funds are available to divorcing spouses only in proportion to the time 
they were accruing during the marriage. Essentially all of the husband's 
resources are retirement funds . Real estate and personal items are 
protected in the marriage by that part of the prenuptial agreement which 
designates them non-available to a divorcing spouse. 
Attorneys fees, awarded to the plaintiff; income tax refund ($3500), 
and two insurance policies were part or tne Judge's give-a-way party, 
4 
having bought into the notion, that the defendant., being a retired 
physician, qualified as a wealthy doctor. This is an inaccurate 
stereotyping job. Evidence of the inaccuracy is provided herewith.(This 
document, p20-22) 
ARGUMENT 
I THE TRIAL COUET FAILED TO BAIHTAIM STANDARDS FOR AM 
INSTRPMEliT OF THE COURT. INACCURACY QF THE YERIFIED 
COHPLAIMT DOCUMENTED.VALIDITY OF AMTEMPPTIAL AGREEMENT 
IS ESTABLISHED 
A. V e r i f i e d Complaint w i t h o u t i n v e s t i g a t i o n and 
v e r i f i c a t i o n i n i t i a t e s f r i v o l o u s l i t i g a t i o n 
The search for t r u t h under the law i s not un l ike the search for t r u t h in 
su rg ica l explora t ion. The su rg ica l dictum, "F i r s t do no harm1 (Primum non 
nocere) i s a l so well known to those in law. There a re instruments to be 
u t i l i z e d under the law and i n surgery, necessary in each case. Surgical 
instruments must he s t e r i l e . , and must be so labeled. They must not add to 
the problem by being contaminated. 
The instrument which opens up a l ega l case i s , of course, the 
complaint, i n t h i s case a "VERIFIED COMPLAINT". The obvious purpose of a 
complaint i s to provide immediately v e r i f i a b l e f ac t s to j u s t i f y l ega l 
proceedings aimed a t discovering a dd i t i ona l support for those f ac t s 
a l ready ve r i f i ed in the complaint. I t i s recognized tha t words such as 
"Verified" become "honored in the breach". But ours i s a day to "bat ten 
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doroi the hatches" against the storms of contamination. 
I t i s again obvious that not everything in, or pertaining, to a 
complaint can be "verified" in advance. But i t i s equally obvious that 
certain facts material to the case must be "verified" in advance in order 
to establ ish any basis whatsoever for the action. Then i t becomes 
appropriate to "verify", that i s , " t o affirm formally or under oath". The 
word "Verified" i s significant , akin to the label , "Ster i le" , on a 
surgical pack. Reference: Utah E. App.P 3.07(9)(b) The s ignature of 
an at torney or party c o n s t i t u t e s a c e r t i f i c a t e by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the bes t of h i s 
or her knowledge, information, and b e l i e f , formed a f t e r 
reasonable inquiry, i t i s not f r i v o l o u s or interposed for the 
purpose of delay as defined by Rule 3 3 . " 
The t r i a l judge, advised perhaps in chambers, took note of the 
error in the date of marriage in paragraph 1. of the verified complaint. 
(Exhibit #6, Marriage Certificate.. State of Hawaii.) He passed over the 
fact that th i s represented an error of consequence. Paragraph 17 of the 
Verified Complaint postulates with impressive exactness the time of 
signing an "Anti-Nuptial Property Agreement" dated October 5, 1989. 
Paragraph 17 continues: "This agreement was executed by the 
Defendant, and presented to the P l a i n t i f f a t 12:00 midnight on 
the evening prior to t h e i r marriage. Prior to that time the 
P l a i n t i f f had had no opportunity to review the Agreement, was 
e n t i r e l y caught by surprise a t the Defendant1s request , was not 
of a s t a t e of mind a t that hour and a t that time to execute , 
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knowingly, suck an agreement, and tlie Agreement lacks any shoving 
of tlie Plaintiff's premarital property. The Agreement is, on 
its face, invalid, unenforceable and overreaching." Counsel 
failed to add the word "non-existent" to his litany of adjectives. No 
"Anti-Nuptial Agreement" is or was in existence. His creativity in 
fabricating a totally unreal scenario of surprise and intimidation must be 
demonstrated, but not before noting his pervasive failure to be accurate 
in the specifics., and failure to read his own documents. (Utah R. App. P 
3.07(9)(b) 
B. ANTENUPTIAL AGREEHENT Y. ANTI-NUPTIAL 
"Anti-Nuptial" undoubtedly refers to the "Ante-Nuptial Property 
Agreement", but here again, one letter or one digit makes an impressive 
difference., repeatedly demonstrating superficiality and a frivolous 
approach to this litigation. But the creation of a scenario to adapt to 
his mistaken date is totally beyond excuse, (see Tr pi20-i27) 
A spelling or typographical error is forgivable. But as the title 
of a document, "ANTI-" for "ANTE" is indicative of the inaccuracy which 
pervades the entire document. And total inaccuracy in the specifics must 
project doubt over the entire instrument in the eyes of the court, just as 
it produced amazement in the defendant. 
TRUTH IN LABELING is applicable to documents. And certainly it is 
not just a layman's perception that a signed document stating, "being 
first duly sworn upon her oath" and then notarized, should be 
truthful. 
Does the preceding signature of an attorney make perjury acceptable? The 
world is not as it should be. But certainly the law should be a reservoir 
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for ¥hat integrity remains, not to be contaminated by outright lies, 
falsely labeled. 
The VERIFIED COHPLAINT is demonstrated (see Tr p. 50) to be 
comprised of financially motivated perjury and is fraudulent in purpose. 
An inaccurate date is the basis of a contrived scenario of midnight 
intimidation (Ref: Certificate of Marriage); wife's sworn statement that 
she was not familiar with the AME-NUPTIAL AGREEMENT is a lie evidenced 
by: 
1. Testimony of husband (see Tr p.120-128) that months before the 
marriage, he had literally put white note cards on the picnic table to 
facilitate discussion of financial arrangements which needed to be 
acceptable before any consideration of marriage. The content of this 
discussion, and numerous subsequent discussions., was simple: What one 
takes into the marriage remains his or hers during the marriage; should 
the marriage dissolve for any reason., each one takes out what he or she 
brought into it. Anything purchased during the marriage would belong to 
the one who supplied the funds. Income derived from activities during the 
marriage was not anticipated (nor realized). ALIHOHY by that name, was 
never discussed in the sanguine days of planning. The word had a negative 
connotation and was never used. That is why testimony reads "Alimony is 
not in my lexicon." (see Tr p.121 L5) But legal construction of the 
AHTEHUPTIAL AGREEDOEHT, as discussed in detail required the word 
"Alimony" and it was read to wife by telephone on October 3.. 1989, at 
which time she directed it be reviewed by her son; and again at the time 
of signing about 9:30 PM on October 5, 1989. But the discussions from the 
beginning had included, in substance, "no payments of any kind in the 
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event of divorce". 
TR 105 L2-25: Wife's counsel argues that husband testified that they 
did not discuss alimony. On the same page he argues incomprehensibly 
about the contract motivating divorce. Separation, and therefore 
divorce, was the wife's action. Again he distorts facts. Tr 121-128: 
It was discussed in mid-summer in unequivocal terms. 
Husband testified (Tr: pi21 L15) that "being familiar with 
financial aspects of her second marriage" he literally put cards on the 
picnic table to anchor the conversation to a discussion of the need for a 
prenuptial agreement should marriage ever become a consideration. 
Material above or following this point may appear redundant since 
the court has accepted the validity of the Antenuptial agreement. 
However, it is necessary to document the wife's perjury and the perfidy of 
the wife's attorney in generating a worse than frivolous case. Obvious 
perjury by the plaintiff makes this case one of outright fraud, fraud 
being recognised as criminal. Does perjury become innocent when co-signed 
by an attorney in a "VERIFIED COHPLAINT" and signed under oath? 
C. PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY1S PERFORMANCE REQUIRES ACTION BY 
THE COURT 
This court is respectfully requested to invoke sanctions 
against the plaintiff-appellee's attorney and assess damages in 
behalf of tlie defendant-appellant. Perjury by tlie plaintiff is 
attorney-sponsored. The scenario of midnight intimidation to obtain 
signature of the Plaintiff on the antenuptial agreement is a joint 
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fabrication. Plaintiff's attorney knows well how the greedy glow of 
financial reward melts integrity like a cutting torch. 
The anguish produced by litigation is very real. Physical 
manifestations can range from cold feet all night to hypertension and 
major depression. Robbery at gunpoint would be only a moment in time, as 
compared to "false arrest" by litigation, imposing months of struggling to 
sublimate anger and frustration while driven by the conviction that 
justice does exist and can prevail. Husband has been bludgeoned by a 
dirty instrument wielded in the name of the law. Discovery as sought by 
wife's attorney was more than a "fishing expedition"; it was more like 
dredging the fishing stream for gold. Discovery is a sentence by a word 
processor, without any trial,to many days of odious work, lacking even the 
virtue of the exercise that one would get in a prison yard breaking rocks 
with a pickaxe. The financial aggression is brazenly avaricious.Tr 94-97, 
85-90. 
The right of an individual with this standard of performance to 
impose on someone else all the stresses, time constraints, and financial 
impact of litigation must be circumscribed by rules no less than the 
standard in Federal court or, more appropriately, by superior judgment as 
in this court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINATION OF HEEDS 
OF THE PLAINTIFF, IN DETERMINATION OF ASSETS OF 
THE DEFENDANT. AND IN AfARD OF ALIMONY 
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A. Four contracts related to the marriage 
influenced the alimony decision. 
Included with the Docketing Statement was a copy of the NOTICE OF 
EHTRT OF DECREE OF DIVORCE. Assuming the Court is cognizant of its 
contents the following facts are relevant There are four contracts 
involved in the present action 
First the contract of marriage was in good faith It was not 
breached by the husband, but rather by the wife almost casually when she 
reacted to the quiet statement that, after a long trip, there was work to 
be done around the home 
Second, the oral contract between the husband and wife remained 
unwritten except in the husbands notes This specified that husband 
would cover all routine expenses of the marriage ami also expend up to 
$25 000 in renovation of the home A home-equity loan in the amount of 
$25 000 still persists Penovation was performed prior to return from 
Hawaii The wife would have all of her usual resources for her own use 
and for production of "her books" (see TR p 25 L16 through p 29 L6) At 
more than $800 per month her "m-pocket" advantage came to more than 
$16 800 during the 21 months of marriage It is appropriate to emphasise 
that this contract was very real totally intangible never challenged by 
wife or counsel and totally executed during the marriage Whatever its 
current status before the law, there exist a maxim He v&o seeks equity 
must ifi? equity Husband contends that his pattern of performance under an 
agreement warrants respect for a more formal contract with which the wife 
was early and fully aware 
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Third, there exists a contract similar to number two just above, 
(see Tr p!4 L6) ¥ife's repeated phrasing of it in casual conversation was 
"DQM'T WORRY, LITTLE HOUHT, I"LL TAKE CARE OF YOU." (Tr79-L25) 
Tnese are tlie words of Stanford Smith, attorney at law, son of 
the plaintiff wife, spoken repeatedly, she states, long before 
this marriage. And in fact he did take care of her with pleasant 
housing, food and concern. His caring wife likewise demonstrated warm 
concern and affection for her mother-in-law. The trial court ruled that 
such a statement does not constitute a legal contract and therefore ex-
husband, being "the bird in the hand", is placed in bondage despite the 
ruling of validity of an agreement designed specifically to escape this 
pattern of extortion. 
It is understandable that wife would choose not to burden her son. But 
the trial court's ruling that she must be pampered with the resources of 
others is not defensible. (Tr pl40 L2 to p!42 L12) She has a total of 
seven productive children, with homes and families, and more space as 
some of their children begin to marry. This warmly phrased contract has 
been tested, it worked, and it is still in effect. This court is 
requested to recognize that we are observing the exercise of a "widow* s 
might" before the trial court. The notion that she is likely to become a 
public charge is absurd. And this court is aware that state support does 
not "kick in" simply because one wants more than one has: and certainly 
not to provide "$ 300 a month", "the majority of it for contributions." 
(see Tr pi40 L2-25) Then there is Recreation at $ 50, and entertainment 
for $100 (see Tr p!40 L22 through p!41 L22) for green fees and sports 
equipment, then another $ 50 for miscellaneous (see Tr pi41 L9). 
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The fourth contract, the ASTENUPTIAL PROPERTY AGREEMENT 
previously discussed in part was found to he valid except that the 
decision regarding alimony rests with the trial judge (Tr P 1 Line 12 to 
P2-L2) " The Pre-Muptial Agreement is binding, as a contract on 
the parties, except as to its provisions regarding the ¥aiver of 
alimony." (Page 2, Line i Decree of Divorce: Second Judicial 
District Court, Civil No. 924700457) 
The AMTEHOPTIAL AGREEHEHT specifies (ANTENOPTTAL PFOPERTT 
AGREEMENT, SECTION YII P4) that in the event of divorce "each of the 
parties hereby waives all claims against the other for alimony, 
spousal support, restitution, and any other legal concept vhich 
would require one Party to pay to the other payments so as to 
equalize to the extent possible, the respective standards of 
living of the Parties in the event of said . . . divorce." 
B. Accurate determination of the Husband's assets is 
essential 
The agreement now has anomalous status IH EFFECT, IT IS YALID 
EXCEPT FOR ITS HAJOR PPOYISIOH. Certainly the judge has the 
prerogative to assess alimony for child support and other reasons, despite 
an antenuptial agreement But to deny the need for alimony and then to re-
mstitute it to keep the rife from becoming a public charge reflects the 
trial court's conclusion that the husband would, m effect never miss the 
amounts involved 
This conclusion follows from the "doctor" stereotype orchestrated by 
plaintiffs attorney, and enthusiastically adopted by the trial judge who 
labeled the defendant husband "a millionaire" The court's attention is 
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directed to this brief mention of the subject at this point. (See 
financial statments on p20-22.) The financial statement speaks for itself 
despite the stereotyping and the trial court's perception of financial 
matters. 
In seeking case law related to the present case., the Trial Court 
(P-l L24) cited Huck v. Buck (734 P.2d 417(Utah 1986)) The case affirms 
"Prenuptial agreement between spouses may not act to deprive 
child of child support, as such right is vested in child." Also 
"Provisions in prenuptial agreement eliminating payment of child 
support or alimony are not binding on the court. " Huck is a case 
involving pregnancy before marriage., a productive working wife, jointly 
acquired property., and parties too young to receive Social Security. 
However, it does establish what is well recognised. The court does have 
jurisdiction as to alimony. But this case in all its dissimilarity does 
not establish any purpose for alimony in the present case. The trial 
court is more concerned about the exercise of a prerogative than in 
justice. Woodward v. Woodward (Utah, 656P.2d 431) has issues parallel to 
those in the present case and is discussed below. 
An award of $650 per month is blithely made by the trial court for a 
marriage which lasted 21 months, (see TR pl?4 L24) It is not at all 
unlikely that the wife might live for another twenty years. Ordered 
alimony payments, purportedly to keep her off welfare rolls, may be 
tabulated as follows: 
One Year: Cash Payment 650 X 12 = 7,800 
Hinimum Tax Kate on withdrawals from retirement funds: 35.35X 
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(Federal 28 % + State 7.35% = 35.35%) 
Annual withdrawals to produce 7800: 
7800 divided by (100-35.35) X 100= $12,064.97 
Tax deduction on 7,800 a t 35.5% = 2,757.30 
Met Cost for one year (including $1508 for taxes) 9,307.67 
Total cost over 20 year period: $186.153.40 
This ordered payment of $186,153 i s in addition to a $17,000 in pocket 
benefit to the wife by vir tue of a l l of her expenses being erased during 
the 21. months of marriage. The additional costs for income tax refund 
sharing, and legal fees makes th is case one of major and unwarranted 
financial aggression against the husband. 
C. Court Errs by Awarding Alimony. 
I t would appear from the case s t u d i e s that there i s a p o l i c y 
requiring omission of information as to age of the p a r t i e s i n the 
divorce a c t i o n s . I t i s apparent from the record that most are i n 
the pre-ret irement category. Reference to Soc ia l Securi ty i s 
notably absent. Certa inly Huck v. Huck (Utah 1986. 734 P2d 417 
there were no Soc ia l Securi ty and other retirement funds 
a v a i l a b l e a s i n the present case . The t r i a l judge's c a l c u l a t i o n s 
of the husbands current income are b izarre . His re f erra l to the 
IRS 1040 needs d i s c u s s i o n . 
The judge verbalized the fact (Tr pl?6 L17) that the purpose of 
alimony i s to keep the wife from becoming a public charge. As stated 
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above the "DON'T WORRY.. LITTLE HOMEY" CONTRACT has been tested in the real 
¥orld and was lived up to, despite no hard copy of a legal document. 
Woodward v. ¥oodward ( Utah, 65 P.2d 431) states (divorce 252.3 (1) 
with regard to retirement funis "whether resource is subject to 
distribution in divorce proceeding does not turn on whether 
spouse can presently use or control it, or whether resource can 
be given present dollar value; essential criterion is whether 
right to benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during 
marriage, and to extent that right has so accrued, it is subject 
to equitable distribution.• 
In the present case, paragraph 8 of the FINDINGS OF FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA¥ states: 'Inasmuch as the Plaintiff has 
waived her claim to any additional personal or real property, 
other than that which she presently possesses, it is unnecessary 
to . . . . address the division of personal property . . . ." 
Aside from recognising that the claim was in-valid without the waiver, it 
is noted that the judge had indicated that the Antenuptial Agreement 
was valid except for alimony. Tr 177 LI: The court: "In this case I 
think the court, for the record, finds that the Prenuptial 
Agreement entered into was valid and that there was proper 
consent and review by the parties, particularly where the 
plaintiff had her son review it. That the prenuptial agreement 
was entered into. Except the court specifically finds, according 
to the Huck decision, that the provision dealing with alimony is 
void as applied to those parties . . . ." 
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Al l retirement funds of the husband accrued pr ior to the 
marriage. This inc ludes Soc ia l Securi ty funds. In the c i t e d 
case the ' t r i a l court properly awarded wife share i n that share 
of husband's retirement b e n e f i t s to which r i g h t s accrued during 
marriage, . . . " 
This decision applies to the present case and isola tes retirement 
funds from alimony payments to the wife. Retirement funds have already 
been used very significantly for court ordered payments because they are 
the only funis available. Resources l i s ted accurately on the Antenuptial 
Property Agreement of 1989 are i n markedly depleted contrast to the 
l i s t i n g i n the body of t h i s document. (See Exhibit #3 p i8 ??) 
The t r i a l court has e s tab l i shed that the personal and rea l 
property i s to remain i n t a c t insofar as the present d e c i s i o n 
p r e v a i l s . 
¥OOD¥ABB Y. ¥OOB¥AKD (Utah, 656 P. 2d 431) i so la tes 
retirement funds from divorce settlements: 
"The t r i a l court properly awarded the wife"s share i n that 
port ion of husband's retirement b e n e f i t s to which r i g h t s accrued 
during marriage. . . ." 
3.Divorce - 252.31 
¥hether resource i s subject to d i s t r i b u t i o n i n divorce 
proceeding does not turn on whether spouse can present ly use or 
control i t , or on whether resource can be g iven present d o l l a r 
value; e s s e n t i a l c r i t e r i o n i s whether r ight to b e n e f i t or a s s e t 
has accrued, i n whole or i n part during marriage, and, to what 
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extent that right has 30 accrued, it is subject to equitable 
distribution." 
In the instant case.. Taylor v. Taylor, it is undisputed that the 
parties brought into the marriage their respective "retirements." The 
wife's retirement consisted of Social Security income, Deseret Mutual 
Benefit, Utah State Teacher's retirement and son Stanford's resources 
provided a stable, livable and workable retirement situation. (Reference 
to the "Oral Antenuptial agreement" (THIS DOCDHEMT PAGE p. 79 L 
24) 
Giving consideration to the "three prong decision" it should be 
noted that the wife came out of the marriage with the same assets and 
retirement funding which provided a comfortable living for her before the 
marriage. As already mentioned, during the 21 months of marriage she had 
the opportunity to set aside $ 17,000.00 for her discretionary use. This 
separation of funds for the wife were so neatly parceled to her for her 
separate use right at the onset of marriage. The amount was not 
insignificant. 
The court is correct in determining that the obligation of the 
wife's son to his mother was not an issue on which the court could rule. 
That issue was not before the court. However, the fact that the wife, 
prior to her marriage to the husband, had for some years lived in an 
amicable situation with her son and his family is an important 
consideration in applying the three factors in Rudman v. Rudman. That 
moral obligation still persists and is valid. 
The wife had demonstrated a successful ability to live comfortably 
and securely on the assets and income acquired prior to the marriage. 
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There was no showing of poverty which brought the wife to a precipitous 
juncture which would open the door for the trial judge to set aside the 
antenuptial agreement., which both parties entered into freely and 
without coercion, to guide them if the marriage failed. It should be 
noted, more specifically than above, that although the trial judge puts 
the length of the marriage at 4 years, the parties actually lived as 
husband and wife for only 21 months. 
Part of the wife's resources rest with that ongoing moral 
obligation of her son to repay a substantial monetary debt. The son's 
acknowledgement and his restitution in part predates by several years the 
marriage of the parties. While it may be convenient for the trial judge 
to ignore that relationship, it nevertheless exists; was unrebutted in 
court; was a factor in the formation of the antenuptial agreement; is 
still a debt owed to the plaintiff; has a major role in the potential of 
the plaintiff to become a "public charge"; and in determining whether to 
honor the alimony provisions of the Antenuptial Agreement. 
In HOCK v. HOCK. 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986), 2. Divorce - 252.3(4), 
"Agreements or stipulation between parties as to alimony is not 
binding on tbe court, but serves only as recommendation. . . • 
The rulings cited allow discretion to set aside alimony portions of 
prenuptial agreement only to the extent that the receiving spouse is 
jeopardised. 
The trial court looked at the standard financial declaration for the 
District Court of Davis County dated August 5, 1993. Under other income, 
pensions and retirement were noted as variable with a round figure of 
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$2000 per month, Social Security at $114? per month This financial 
declaration i s inadequate as a guide to income in the current case And 
the t r i a l court ' s perception of husband's assets and income must be 
addressed in de ta i l (Transcript P 170 L 25 to P 172 L 10) 
D. Husband's Assets as of Tr ia l Date are Determined. 
Sappleye T. Rappleye Utah, 855 P2d 260 indicates that resources 
should be evaluated as of the date of t r i a l in th is case November 1 
1993 This date incidentally i s fortuitous as to accuracy inasmuch as i t 
coincides ¥ i th end of month reports and more signif icantly with yearly tax 
notices which supply value figures for real assets 
In addition to updating the information, which was not immediately 
available before, a more significant consideration must be included here 
Petirement funds are net equivalent to a savings account in determining 
l iqu id i ty The judge on page «;TP 171-Lme 1-10) states that the value of 
the a s s e t s i s s l i g h t l y i n excess of one m i l l i o n d o l l a r s and that 
a l i t t l e over one-half i s vhat the court would deem to be l iqu id 
a s s e t s " . 
Tabulated herewith is a list of assets as of October 31, 
1993, being financial reports, and copies of Tax assessors" 















Ideal Beach Apt (50$) Approx. Equity 9..000 
Total Real Property $ 399,795 
Retirement Funds Net Yalue - Oct 31, 1993 
IRA Account 129-080162 63,063.82* 
Target Benefit 129-060470 : 
From Report 238,820.66* 
(Margin Debt: $ 123,968.34) 
Santa Clara Lots - 34,874 273,694.66 
Profit Sharing Plan -
From Report 92,092.36* 
(Margin Debt- 36,907.64) 
Pinnacle West(separate) 1,621.87 
Total Profit Sharing 93,714.23 
Retirement Accounts Total $ 430,472.71 
Personal Checking Account - Fidel i ty USA Account 
•Total of Retirement Fund3 i n F i d e l i t y Report3 393,975.84* 
F i d e l i t y USA p o r t f o l i o for October 29, 1993 : 
Under Other F i d e l i t y Accounts i s the f igure 554,852.++ 
The d i f f erence 160,876* 
represents the sun of the margin debt 36,907.64 
123,968.66 
160,876.30 
This i s important in explaining what would appear to be a discrepancy, and 
to explain an inappropriate figure reported in the p r e - t r i a l Financial 
Statement. 
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Specifics of the USA account: 
Equities on page 2: Harket Yalue of General Re and Pacificorp 
totals $ 28,037. They serve as collateral for Hargin Debt 
(essentially a persisting overdraft) of 14,304.16-
Het Yalue in USA account Oct 29, 93: 13,732.84 
Accounts Payable: Home Equity 23,532.88 
Saint Harks FCA Hospital 473.38 
Total payables 24,006.26 
Sayings Acct: First Security: Corpus for trust 
Sep 30. J993 130.62 
Met of Personal Accounts: -10,142.80 
Summary: 
Real Property 399,795.00 
Retirement Accounts 430,472.71 
Met of Personal Accounts -10,142.80 
Total (lacking personal property) $820,124.91 
E. TRIAL JUDGE y. REALITY 
For the present court it is unnecessary to stress the difference 
between a retirement account and a sayings account (on which 
taxes haye already been paid.) But the trial judge estimated 
that the husband had a half million in liquid assets. 
Specifically, postulating the lowest tax rate of 28X for Federal 
and 7.35X for State Tax, it would require (500,000 x 100/64.65) 
=773,395) $ 773,395 to come up with a half million dollars, and 
? ? 
much more than that i f i t vere taken out a l l i n one year thereby 
bringing on a much higher tax rate . 
The retirement accounts above, ($430,473) of course, would 
be taxed a t l e a s t 35X, y i e l d i n g a maximum of 278,301 d o l l a r s , a 
far cry from a half m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . 
Haumont v , Haumont Utah 793 P2D 421: 2. Divorce 252.3(1): " As 
general ru l e , equity requires that each party r e t a i n separate 
property he or she brought in to marriage. " This i s unrelated to 
the presence of a prenuptial agreement. 
Likewise, Rappleye Y, Rappleye 855 P.2d 270 (Utah App 1993) 
in paragraph 4. Divorce: "Premarital property genera l l y i s 
considered separate property and w i l l be retained by party who 
brought i t in to marriage." 
In the instant case, under the agreement and under the judgment, the 
husband's real property and his persons.! property are his . He has no 
other assets except retirement funds which have already been significantly 
assailed by this sui t . Woodward v. foodcard, Ibid. , prohibits the attack 
on retirement funds. Therefore., there i s no source for alimony, short of 
attacking the real property which i s protected by the interpretat ion of 
the AHTEHUPTIAL PROPERTY AGREEHEMT. THE DEFENDANT SEEKS 
PROTECTION OF THE REAL PROPERTY FROH HOTIONS TO SHO¥ CAUSE why 
such property should not he u t i l i z e d to s a t i s f y the demand for 
alimony. If t h i s court , the Court of Appeals, sus ta ins the award 
of alimony, i t l eaves the defendant open to attack on h i s real 
property. This presumes that the court w i l l uphold the v a l i d i t y 
of Woodward v.Woodward, lb id . and exempt retirement funds from 
award to the wife by means of alimony. 
Defendant-appellant husband's retirement fund accrual terminated 
prior to his retirement on January 31/1989. Marriage date was October 
6,1989. f i f e ' s counsel has sought to establish trends in the funds.. 
par t icu lar ly increases, during the marriage, contending that the word 
"accrual" i s synonymous with appreciation in value, thereafter, to claim 
that there was accrual during the marriage. I t i s def ini te ly established 
by Woodward v. Woodward, Ibid, that accrual refers to the accumulation of 
funds from deposits made to them in the name of the employee during his 
employment. (See Woodward v. Woodward, Ibid. (3)252.3 1) 
I I I . The Court Erred in Awarding Income Tax Refund 
and Insurance Po l ic ies to P l a in t i f f . 
A. INCOME TA2 REFUHB AWAKD TO PLAIMTIFF-APPELLEE 
Husband, prior to having income tax return completed or estimated, 
made payments far in excess of what he expected to need to pay, the 
purpose being to be certain that there would be no deficiency assessments 
or penalties. (His notion that interest drawn on the over-payment would 
balance out other factors was subsequently corrected by his accountant. 
The accountant also pointed out that there was a definite financial 
disadvantage to filing jointly, as had been done. The accountant's record 
pertaining to this was not admitted at the hearing on the subject.) 
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The federal refund in the amount of $5,526 came f i r s t , and a t husband's 
request the check was endorsed by the wife and the husband deposited i t to 
his account. The wife a t no time made any financial payment to th is or 
any other expense item of the marriage. About one month after the Federal 
refund, a refund from the State of Utah in the amount of $ 1523 was 
received. When husband contacted wife about endorsing th is check, she 
stated that her attorney was concerned about her having signed the f i r s t 
one, and she could not sign the second one. Husband therefore endorsed 
the check to her indicating that i t represented the 500 dollar payment for 
the months of December 1992, January and February of 1993 (with a 23 
dollar excess). (Exhibit #17.) 
Husband r e s p e c t f u l l y p e t i t i o n s tke court for return of these 
funds, vbicb were paid to tlie wi fe , v ia Hr. Green i n the amount 
of $ 3 ,524.50 by a check drawn from Target Benef i t Plan, a 
retirement fund on March 18, 1994 Request for return i s based on 
the fac t that return of funds i s appropriate , regardless of what 
source husband used for the payment. 
B. THE COUET ERKEB IN A¥ARDIHG BEHEFITS FKOH IHSTEtAHCE OH 
THE LIFE OF THE HU5BAHD TO THE WIFE. 
The t r i a l judge., apparently on his own i n i t i a t i v e , awarded the wife 
t¥0 pol icies insuring the husband . One, a paid up policy with Beneficial 
Life i s in the amount of approximately $8,000, maintained specif ical ly for 
the immediate expenses expected to he incurred a t time of death. The 
second policy in the face amount of $2,000 dollars i s with Metropolitan 
Life of Canada and the beneficiary i s "the Estate of Louise D. Taylor", 
L.0 
husband's wife who died in 1975 I t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y requested tliat 
the Court of appeals reverse t h i s a c t i o n of the t r i a l judge. 
C. CORRECTION OF THE CODRT RECORD (TRANSCRIPT). 
I t i s the i n t e n t i o n of the husband, as counsel pro se x to 
motion the t r i a l court for correc t ion of the record (Transcript) 
i n cer ta in minor but s i g n i f i c a n t areas . Discuss ion of these 
matters w i l l be deferred a t t h i s time. 
CONCLUSION 
For reasons that are stated herewith, the Appellate Court should 
reverse a l l the financial decisions of the t r i a l judge 
The need for sanctions against the p l a i n t i f f ' s attorney i s defini te 
and losses due to his machinations are very real 
Respectfully Submitted, 
F Willis Taylor 
Dated th is ^ c / day of > ^ ^ ^ 1994 
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